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At Davos in 2016, John Chipman, Director General (DG) and Chief 
Executive of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) while 
participating in a discussion on world affairs, stated that the world during 
the 20th century had lived tactically but in the 21st century, the world 
will have to learn to live strategically. What does that mean and how is it 
relevant in understanding the strategic relevance of the Indo-Pacific?
The Indo-Pacific region1 as a whole is witnessing major shifts in 
terms of economics, strategic behaviour, and diplomatic manoeuvring 
among the major powers. Especially, as each nation competes with 
the other in order to create its own sphere of influence to exploit the 
potential of the region as a whole. The creation of a single strategic 
system in the Indo-Pacific region by combining accelerated economic 
and security connections becomes the fulcrum between the western 
Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Will the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ region 
help in integrating and uniting the major powers into one single 
strategic system?
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Theoretically, both India and China realise that the normative 
and institutional architecture of the Indo-Pacific will shape the future 
international order. Ultimately, India’s engagement in the western Indian 
Ocean must not only protect its own economic, energy, and diaspora 
interests but also cohesively link with its “Act East” policy to preserve 
a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.2 There is something Mahanian 
in the way China is building up its maritime power and increasing its 
influence over trade in the region. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a 19th century 
American naval strategist who viewed the domination of maritime routes 
for both commercial and strategic gains, has become obligatory reading 
among Chinese naval thinkers. Tracing the logic identified by Mahan a 
hundred years ago, the Chinese moves look very hegemonic in design, 
adding the supplemental development twist as bait. This strategy seeks to 
safeguard and control vital the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), 
bringing trade and energy from Europe and the Middle East. In doing 
so, China also seeks to contain India’s rise and stop it from dominating its 
own ‘near abroad’, the height of hypocrisy considering the US’ support 
for its own rise and its own strategy in the South China Sea. However, 
Australian advocates of the so-called ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ 
(QSD—also known as the QUAD) (which brings together the United 
States, Japan, India and Australia) must now feel as if the wind is well and 
truly in their sails.3
In this perspective, the paper seeks to examine the theoretical moorings 
to assess the emerging consensus on a geostrategically important region 
under the label of Indo-Pacific.
Genesis of the Term ‘Indo-Pacific’
On June 01, 2018, addressing the keynote address at the Shangri-La 
Dialogue in Singapore, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated 
that India would work with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) to promote a “rules-based order” in the Indo-Pacific region.4 
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The term Indo-Pacific is not a new concept. Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe first proposed the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007 
during his failed first term, which then fell apart after it was opposed once 
Australia’s Labour Party-led government assumed power. However, the 
idea of an Indo-Pacific region endured and the notion has constantly 
resurfaced in the international arena. To say so, as in former US President 
Barack Obama’s Administration, during its pivot to Asia.5 Most recently, 
former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Adviser 
H.R. McMaster began using the term Indo-Pacific instead of Asia-Pacific.6
From 2010 onwards, the term Indo-Pacific acquired salience 
within the Indian context and has since been used often by India’s apex 
political leadership. 2011 onwards, the term has been used frequently 
by strategic analysts and high-level government and military leadership 
in Australia, Japan and the US to denote the said region. However, an 
official documented articulation of the term first appeared in Australia’s 
2013 Defence White Paper.7 It has been argued that the concept of the 
Indo-Pacific may lead to a change in the popular “mental maps” of how 
the world is understood in strategic terms. Lately, US officials have begun 
using the term “Indo-Asia Pacific”. This will enable America to maintain 
its geographic inclusiveness in the new coinage of ‘Indo-Pacific’.8
The term’s profile was raised when it found mention in the joint 
statement issued by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the 
United States’ President Donald Trump after the former’s state visit to the 
White House on June 26, 2017.9 In their statement, both sides agreed that 
a close partnership between the United States and India is central to peace 
and stability in the region.10 In marking 70 years of diplomatic relations 
between India and the United States, the leaders resolved to expand 
and deepen the strategic partnership between the countries and advance 
common objectives. Above all, these objectives include combatting terrorist 
threats, promoting stability across the Indo-Pacific region, increasing free 
and fair trade, and strengthening energy linkages.
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The US vision of the Indo-Pacific strategy was first set out by former 
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson when talking about US-India relations: 
“Defining our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” at the Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in October 2017.11 Tillerson 
mentioned the Indo-Pacific region 19 times and stressed, “The Indo-Pacific, 
including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the nations that 
surround them, will be the most consequential part of the globe in the 21st 
century,” and that “[t]he world’s center of gravity is shifting to the heart of 
the Indo- Pacific”.12 Tillerson heavily criticised China’s provocative actions in 
the South China Sea as a direct challenge to international law and norms and 
emphasised that the US is already “capturing the benefits of our important 
trilateral engagement between the US, India, and Japan. As we look ahead, 
there’s room to invite others, including Australia, to build on the shared 
objectives and initiatives”.13 In his remarks to the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation’s (APEC’s) Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) Summit at Da 
Nang, Vietnam, on November 11, 2017, US President Donald Trump 
defined the strategic scope of the Indo-Pacific as covering both the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans, including Japan, Australia, and India.14 However, Trump 
did not clearly propose the contents of his Indo-Pacific strategy or any goals, 
potential partners, or its relationship with China.
To note, in linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans into a single 
geographical space, most scholars and analysts have discussed the vaguely 
defined Indo-Pacific concept within a geostrategic or geopolitical frame. 
The flurry of analytical articles (47,000, one link has over 193 other links 
to the same subject) over the past years, often contain common themes 
such as: containment, militarisation, and rebalancing vis-à-vis China’s 
rise and assertiveness. Yet, there is more to gain from a geoeconomic 
perspective. Further, from a non-traditional security dimension, enhanced 
Indo-Pacific cooperation will yield significant benefits.
Geopolitics on the Asian continent is organised around the numerous 
seas, bays and lagoons that fringe its expansive oceans. The Indo-Pacific 
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idea simply expands the conceptual region of Asia-Pacific to include India 
and the Indian Ocean. The QSD translates this geopolitical understanding 
into strategy, envisaging the two oceans as a single security space, which 
includes India and Japan, is bridged by Australia, and is undergirded by US 
maritime dominance. The impetus for such a reconceptualisation is simple: 
Japan and India, isolated as they are in their own oceans, want to balance 
against the western Pacific’s rising power, China, by uniting under a single 
geopolitical sphere. While Trump’s National Security Adviser, General HR 
McMaster argued that the “term better captures the new regional dynamic”, 
as he stated: “The idea of the Indo-Pacific and the proposition that India 
must be involved in shaping the Asian balance of power go well back in 
time. Before we trace the recent evolution of the concept, it is important 
to note that oceanographers use the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ to describe the 
bio-geographic region comprising the warm tropical waters of the Indian 
Ocean and the western and central Pacific Ocean”.15
The Problematics
The Indo-Pacific region is undergoing a dramatic transformation and has 
been in a state of flux. This is witnessed in the undergoing shifts in the 
Indo-Pacific region, which is far from reaching a settling point.  The trends 
that underscore the dramatic shift in power relativities are as follows: first, 
China is predicted to overtake the United States by 2030 as the world’s 
largest economy in market exchange rate terms. Second, for its part, India 
is the fastest growing big economy in the world and is expected to become 
the world’s third largest economy in US dollar terms by 2030. Third, it is 
predicted that by 2050, Indonesia will leap from the 16th largest economy 
today into the top 10 economies; Vietnam may be one of the fastest growing 
large economies; and established economies like Japan, South Korea and 
Australia will drop in relative Gross Development Product (GDP) rankings. 
Given these trends at play, though there are speculations over the decline of 
the US, it is very likely that US primacy in the region will continue for some 
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time yet. The US is predicted to remain amongst the top three economies 
by 2050. Furthermore, its military and technological investments provide 
it a sizeable edge in the future, which is also supported by its immense soft 
power and influence in the region. In view of this flux, ‘uncertainty’ has 
become the defining feature of the region.
China’s actions in the South China Sea are adding to the uncertainty 
and we are again seeing a rise in tensions on the Korean peninsula given 
North Korea’s attempts to conduct nuclear tests, prompting a strong 
response from the US. Separately, China has protested the deployment of 
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system 
in South Korea. In reaction to the growing uncertainty, and with a shift 
of economic weight, to and within the Indo-Pacific, it is resulting in the 
rise of military capabilities.
By 2020, combined military budgets in the Indo-Pacific will probably 
exceed US$600 billion, matching military spending in North America 
for the first time. According to the 2016 Defence Outlook by Deloitte16:
  The Indo-Pacific is expected to drive 60 per cent of the global increase 
in defence acquisition, research and development.
  Nineteen countries in our region will account for one-third of global 
defence budgets by 2020; and, specifically:
  China will build 30 new submarines and another new aircraft carrier.
The threat of terrorism17 is pervasive, unpredictable and highly 
adaptive. Prime Ministers Modi and Turnbull acknowledged in their 
joint statement that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious 
threats to peace and stability. It preoccupies nearly every government. 
The same technologies that have enabled greater connectivity, access, 
communication and economic opportunities have also contributed to the 
spread of terrorism and radicalisation, particularly among the youth.
Climate change is bringing significant impacts as sea levels rise and 
weather patterns change, affecting agriculture, industry and critical 
STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
104  CLAWS Journal l Winter 2018
infrastructure. Policies to address climate change, for example, expanding 
renewable energy sources, will also drive changes in the structure of 
economies in the Indo-Pacific. The pace of technological change and 
the internet have political and social effects, as well as economic ones. 
News just travels faster. World leaders communicate by mobile phone, 
text message and Twitter. Information is more fragmented. People are 
less likely to be influenced by large institutions, the government or the 
mainstream media, and political outcomes are less predictable. 
In view of this, the two key strategic observations are: first, a secure, 
stable and connected Indo-Pacific region is crucial for the security and 
prosperity of all the countries in the region. Creating an order that is 
flexible, resilient and nimble will be vital to secure our collective future. 
Second, a comprehensive American-Indian strategic partnership seems 
unlikely, and a formal alliance comparable to the one that the US has 
with Japan and Australia is not on the cards. With its long history of non-
alignment and traditionally close ties with Russia, India’s policy-making 
elites are loath to compromise its strategic autonomy.
Major Actors in Indo-Pacific
Japan
The Indo-Pacific strategy comprises threat-driven security cooperation 
among like-minded maritime countries to promote a rules-based regional 
order. This is in response to the rapid strategic and power structural 
changes characterised by China’s assertive behaviour in the region, which 
pose increasing challenges to the US and its allies in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. In view of this, Japan has been vigorously promoting the QUAD 
cooperation in carrying out the Indo-Pacific strategy largely to facilitate and 
institutionalise Japan’s maritime security cooperation with the surrounding 
nations and allow Japan to play a leading role in the region. In addition 
to bilateral security ties with the US, Australia, India and other countries, 
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Japan’s strategic choice to network with more strategic partners in the 
region implies a hedging stance to avoid the dilemma of both abandonment 
and entrapment. A major power struggle between the US and China would 
allow Japan with more diplomatic and security manoeuvrability. It will also 
largely decrease Japan’s time and the cost pressure of regional security 
burden-sharing demanded by the US and simultaneously call for higher 
US engagement in the region, with collective structures. Thus, the Indo-
Pacific strategy is not about forming an anti-China alliance of nations but 
a trilateral, functional and regional coalition against China’s provocative 
actions, by joint exercises and training, capacity-building, and promoting 
regional communication platforms.
In this perspective, it is necessary to examine the role that Japan seeks 
to play in the Indo- Pacific Region. As outlined in the “Priority Policy for 
Development Cooperation FY 2017”,18 Japan seeks to contribute in three 
key areas, which are: first, in developing an environment for international 
peace, stability and prosperity and sharing universal values. Second, 
addressing global issues to achieving Senstainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and promoting human security. And third, promoting economic 
diplomacy that aims at “quality growth,” together with the developing 
countries, and contribute to regional revitalisation. 
China
So far, China has not been able to adopt the concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
formally. However, at the same time, the use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
is being seen in most of its scholarly writings and analyses. To a greater 
extent, such usage of the term will pave the way for China to develop an 
Indian Ocean strategy. China has been completely preoccupied with the 
disputes on its eastern maritime edge. Such preoccupation has led it to 
enhance its presence, and reflect its strategic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific 
region. China’s overwhelming capabilities and its larger aspiration to 
become unipolar in Asia in a multipolar world have created competition 
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among the major powers. China’s signalling to the rest of the world 
about its aggressiveness through its military posturing has fuelled a lot 
of debates regarding challenges to the successful building of the Indo-
Pacific security architecture.
Watching with increasingly alarm, Tokyo and New Delhi pushed hard 
to resurrect the US-Japan-India-Australia QUAD – as an ‘alternative’ to 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the talks have focussed more 
on the importance of keeping the Indo-Pacific region “free and open”,19 
especially with regard to “maritime safety and security”, only hinting at 
an alternative infrastructure strategy; however, this is rapidly changing. 
This Great Game is less about ‘containing’ China as Beijing would have 
us believe, and more about diversifying choices available to countries in 
the region. Naturally, there is a geostrategic ‘balancing’ element to this as 
well. Canberra, bullied by Beijing in a domestic scandal involving Chinese 
interference in its domestic affairs, has pushed for closer relations with 
both the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as a way of balancing China’s interference in its domestic affairs.20 
It is beginning to find the true cost of having China as its largest trading 
partner, and has begun a national debate on how to respond to this, 
racked by cynical accusations of racism. While the Trump Administration 
considers possible policy options in a ‘free and open strategy’ – see Eric 
Sayers excellent prescriptions here—Japan and India are already moving 
forward on their own infrastructure diplomacy.21
As countries begin to realise the implications to Beijing’s ‘debt 
diplomacy’, there’s definite scope for Delhi and Tokyo to make headway 
as an alternative type of development pact. While Sri Lanka has been 
seeking increased investment from Tokyo and Delhi in recent months 
to unburden itself from the Chinese loans22, the two need to be more 
forward-reaching in what they can offer. They also need to design a 
broader strategy, rather than merely reacting to China’s development 
plans on an ad hoc basis. This reactive strategy has already cost them the 
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‘race’ in countries like Nepal and the Maldives. Due to their geographic 
locations, both countries have historic ties to India, however, both have 
aligned with China over infrastructure investment. The BRI is financing 
a fibre optic network throughout Nepal (with a command centre in 
Kathmandu), ending the country’s dependence on India for internet 
bandwidth.23 The Maldives Ambassador to China, Mohamed Faisal, 
noted that though India was offered “a number of projects”, they “did 
not receive the necessary finance” to be brought into the development 
stage.24 Now, India is facing a security problem in the region, as China’s 
‘string of pearls’ strategy ties up countries right on India’s doorstep.
To note, the Indo-Pacific is swiftly becoming the locus for a reemergence 
of geopolitics, writ large, and all the professions of “win-win” are fading 
into the background as Chinese merchants and bankers are increasingly 
being followed by Chinese Navy vessels.25 This new Great Game sees India 
and Japan competing with China for SLOC security in the Indo-Pacific and 
may see a reemergence of gunboat diplomacy if we’re not careful. Robert 
Zoellick once called for China to become a “responsible stakeholder”, and 
while Beijing claims it is not a status quo challenger, the fact is that it 
is redrawing the rules of the game.26 While there is some justice in this, 
China’s authoritarian regime type makes the prospect of a Chinese-led 
order an untenable one for liberal democracies. How the new Great Game 
plays out in the Indo-Pacific depends on the willingness of Asia’s other 
great powers to defend a system, rather than contain a new empire.27
India
In the recent years, New Delhi has purposefully intensified its engagement 
with countries in the Asia Pacific region. Having secured support from the 
US and some countries in the region, India is now looking to expand its 
presence in the Asia-Pacific. While for years, India’s position towards the 
region has not attracted much attention, this is gradually changing. The 
development also reflects the wider canvas of changing strategic equations 
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in the region with the rising of China and India. The main argument set 
forth in this study is that as India carries out its own pivot to Asia-Pacific 
policy, a role transformation is underway. India is not satisfied with being 
identified as a mere regional power confined to South Asia. Instead, over 
the last few years, India has signalled a willingness to play a greater strategic 
role in the Indo-Pacific, building up partnerships with the US, Japan and 
Vietnam. India also tries to be a security provider as New Delhi is carefully 
following developments in the South China Sea. There is a widespread 
perception that India’s role in the region will continue to grow. Beijing will 
remain alert to the risk of India’s Act East policy.
India’s efforts to step up its influence in the Asia-Pacific region have 
been increasingly discernible in recent years. The Act East policy reflects 
the rapidly changing geopolitical realities in the Asia-Pacific, mainly 
defined by the rise of China and India, and increased convergence of 
interest between India and the US. India’s eastward maritime attention has 
been complemented by unprecedented role changes. India is conceiving 
a new and more ambitious role for itself in the Asia-Pacific. There is a 
widespread perception that India’s role in the region will continue to 
grow. Meanwhile, India also tries to be a security provider. New Delhi is 
carefully following developments in the South China Sea though it is not 
a direct participant in the South China Sea bilateral security discussions 
with countries, including the US, Japan and Vietnam. Today, there is 
a conscious effort by the Modi government not only to “Look South 
China Sea”’, but also ‘Act South China Sea’. As part of its Act East policy, 
India is helping Vietnam build up maritime capacities. No matter whether 
Beijing likes it or not, India has emerged as one of key players in the 
Asia-Pacific strategic landscape. India is well aware of the implications 
of confronting China, and souring relations with Beijing is not in its 
economic interest. So, New Delhi will not meddle in the disputes directly. 
India will adopt a more prudent policy towards the South China Sea in 
a bid to pressure China while avoiding provocations. Even so, India has 
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already achieved some success. New Delhi is welcomed in the region by 
Washington and its partners. With its growing power, India will strive to 
expand its influence in the South China Sea. There is still plenty left in 
the tank. 
India is ‘pushing back’ on China’s expansion of influence in the Indian 
Ocean in a number of ways, but each comes with its own challenges, such 
as: first, India aims to selectively challenge China’s infrastructure projects 
with Indian alternatives, including economic support, port and energy 
development. These include Indian investments for port projects in 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran, and access to an Omani port; the Iranian 
project is unlikely to be implemented due to US-Iran tensions. Second, 
India has made a point of appearing as one of the first contributors 
to humanitarian and disaster relief operations in its neighbourhood. 
A key unspoken message of these missions is of India’s proximity and 
preparedness to step in vis-à-vis China. Third, New Delhi has sought 
to expand bilateral maritime-security and defence cooperation with the 
island and littoral states, including the provision of defence-related lines of 
credit, and has overseen the launch of a coastal surveillance radar project 
in the Seychelles; it plans construction and upgrading of an airstrip and 
jetty on the Mauritian Island of Agaléga and Assumption Island in the 
Seychelles for surveillance purposes.28
United States of America
One of the new dynamics of the gathering geopolitical turbulence in Asia 
and its waters is the growing use of the term ‘Indo-Pacific’. During his 
extended visit to Asia in November 2017, US President Donald Trump 
defined the region as ‘Indo-Pacific’ rather than the customary ‘Asia-Pacific’. 
Concepts of geopolitical space are never static, and Trump’s emphasis on 
the Indo-Pacific underlines the rise of India, China’s assertiveness and its 
expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean, as well as Washington’s plans 
to elevate its strategic partnership with New Delhi. It involves America’s 
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strategic bet on India’s future role in shaping the security architecture in 
the eastern hemisphere. Actively promoted in recent years by Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the Indo-Pacific conception can be traced 
back to the decision of the ASEAN to invite India as a founding member 
of the East Asia Summit in 2005. The durability of the Indo-Pacific 
dynamic, however, will depend essentially on New Delhi’s willingness to 
work with the US and its allies in the region.
From the end of 2017, the US, too, has been adopting the theme of a 
free and open Indo-Pacific. In his speech in October 2017, US Secretary 
of State Rex Tillerson called for a hundred-year partnership in the Indo-
Pacific between the US and an India that was ‘rising responsibly’, given 
that the centre of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific. As 
Tillerson noted: “The US and India – with our shared goals of peace, 
security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture – must 
serve as the eastern and western beacons of the Indo-Pacific. As the port 
and starboard lights between which the region can reach its greatest and 
best potential”.29 That is to say, Washington has put the ‘Indo-Pacific’ 
firmly in the American strategic lexicon.
Conclusion
For the Indo-Pacific concept to gain traction in the region, it has to 
move away from the rhetoric of military competition and a zero sum 
game. Rather, it should move towards a more constructive, cooperative, 
and inclusive framework. As a geoeconomic entity, there is boundless 
potential in the Indo-Pacific. Linking the two oceans into one cooperative 
geographical space is not inconceivable, especially because it is not a new 
concept in this region. ASEAN has long led the way with its multilateral 
and inclusive platforms of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994 
and East Asia Summit (EAS) since 2005. The Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), even though it is still undergoing 
negotiations, is another key effort to deepen economic partnership and 
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integration among countries that fall within the scope of an Indo-Pacific 
region. The US-China trade war is a great destabiliser and disrupter 
globally. Amid this atmosphere of uncertainty and fear, cooperation and 
hope are needed more than ever. A development-driven cooperative 
framework can bring more optimism and stability to the region.
Japan’s quality control methods in manufacturing and product safety 
are well known globally. However, given its declining domestic workforce, 
Japan could join forces with the growing ASEAN’s young population to 
expand Japan’s manufacturing strength in ASEAN. Together, they could 
potentially create the next manufacturing miracle – guaranteeing Japanese 
quality and workmanship at a competitive ASEAN price.
All the major and smaller players in the region have a stake in the 
stability, growth, and success of the Indo-Pacific region, and it does 
not make sense economically to prefer containment over cooperation. 
Furthermore, the perception of whether a country is a partner and 
whether a country is a competitor is not static, and can change over time. 
The US-Japan alliance has been relatively stable and strong since the end 
of World War II. Nevertheless, when Japan was at its economic peak in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was talk in the US over whether it 
should be contained. In fact, Japan’s economic expansion was described 
as ‘uncontrolled and unbalanced’, and hurting American interests. Fast 
forward 20 years later, China is now perceived as the competitor. And 20 
years from now or even earlier, India could be the next rising power, with 
its economic growth potential. By then, does it mean that India then will 
become the next competitor, to be contained? Certainly not, as otherwise 
the region will be in a perpetual cycle of containment.
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